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Abstrak: Studi Evaluatif terhadap Maqâshid as-Syarîah sebagai Teori Hukum. Artikel ini memberikan akun sejarah
tentang teori maqashid as-syari’ah dengan tujuan untuk menunjukkan bagaimana teori tersebut berkembang.
Akun sejarah ini sangat signifikan untuk mengapresiasi ijtihad orang-orang hebat generasi pertama, yakni para
sahabat yang telah mewujudkan dan menenamkan ide maqashid as-syari’ah. Di sampig itu, muncul juga kontribusi
yang disumbangkan oleh para ulama seperti al-Qaffâl, al-’Âmir, al-Juwaini, dan al-Ghazali yang mengembangkan
teori tersebut yang kemudian disusul oleh as-Syatibi, Ibn Ashur, dll yang menstandarisasinya menjadi sebuah teori
yang dipenuhi dengan prospek penelitian lapangan yang mandiri. Penelitian ini menyimpulkan bahwa pemahaman
yang tepat tentang teori maqashid as-syari’ah tersebut sangat penting diterapkan terhadap konsep dan penerapan
hukum Islam secara tepat. Fakta bahwa teori ini sangat dinamis dan mampu beradaptasi membuatnya mampu
berevolusi dan berkembang. Oleh karena itu, tak terelakkan lagi bahwa teori maqashid as-syari’ah itu mampu
beradaptasi dan merupakan hukum Islam yang relevan sepanjang waktu dan di semua tempat. Sebagian besar
metode yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah sejarah.
Kata kunci: maqâshid as-syarîah; teori hukum Islam.
Abstract: A Study of Evolution of Maqâshid as-Syarîah (objectives of Islamic Law) as Legal Theory. This paper gives a
historical account of the theory ofmaqashid as-syari’ah with a view to showing how it actually evolved. This historical
account is especially significant in order to appraise the efforts of those great individuals of the first generation (the
Companions), who embodied and lived the idea of maqashid as-syarî’ah. Also, it shall shed light on the contributions
made by pioneer scholars (al-Qaffâl, al-’Âmir, al-Juwaynî, al-Ghazâlî) who developed the theory, and the later ones
(Shâthibî, Ibn Ashur, etc.) who standardized it to become a full-fledged theory with prospects of becoming an
independent field of study. The study concludes that proper understanding of the theory is crucial for the correct
conception and application of Islamic law. The fact that the theory is characterized with dynamism and adaptability
make it ever evolving and expanding. Thus it is an inevitable tool for ensuring the adaptability and relevance of Islamic
law at all times and in all places. Expectedly, the method used in this research is largely historical.
Keywords: maqâshid as-syarîah; Islamic legal theory
Introduction
Maqasid as-syari’ah is an important Islamic
legal theory which deals with the very objectives
behind Lawgiver’s various commands and
prohibitions. It presupposes that realization
of human benefits is the ultimate and overall
objective which the Lawgiver seeks to achieve.
Diverse as they may be, human benefits are
categorized into three categories, namely
necessity, need, and embellishment. The first
category is given proper attention by jurists and
authors across ages. This is because it category
entails five fundamental human benefits and
interests (i.e. religion, life, intellect, progeny,
and property) for the protection of which the
Lawgiver has stipulated certain stiff penalties.
The theory is an indispensable tool for proper
understanding and application of Islamic law.
Therefore, this paper studies the theory from
historical perspectives. The idea is to dig deep
into its origin and development with a view to see
how it was conceived by the pioneer exponents
and standardized by the later jurists to be a full-
fledged legal theory assuming a unique status
as far as Islamic law is concerned.
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Origin and Development of Maqâshid As-
Syarîah
A comprehensive history of maqâshid as-
syari’ah can be traced to the first period of Islam
when the message bearer (SAW) was alive. Legal
injunctions contained in the Prophetic Traditions
were fundamentally premised on the concept
of taysîr (facilitating or making things easy),
which is a necessary manifestation of maqasid
as-syari’ah. This concept was well understood and
internalized by the Companions of the Prophet
(SAW), because of the fact that they lived at
the time of revelation. Apart from witnessing
substantial parts of revelation, their enquiries, in
most cases, constituted reasons behind revelation;
at times revelations would come down to the
Prophet (SAW) in response to one or two issues
consequent upon actions, inactions, reactions
and interactions of the Companions among
themselves. Their proximity to the message
bearer both home and away, and during the
periods of peace and of war was very crucial to
their full awareness of the fact that the entire
corpus of the syarî’ah is purpose-oriented and that
it is ultimately designed to ensure human benefit.
In addition to this, they were well versed in
Arabic language by instinct, which is the language
of revelation. Added to the above factors is a
host of personal attributes such as high level
of intelligence, sincerity, honesty, and strong
commitment to the cause of Islam which they all
possessed.1 In view of this, there is every reason
to assume that all legal verdicts and judgments
made by the companions were in line with the
fundamental principles of maqâshid as-syarî’ah
the means of which yusr (ease) and mashlahah
(human benefits) are achieved.
Instances are in abundance to show that
the companions were practically curious to
understand the objective of every ruling of the
syarî’ah. One telling instance has to do with the
episode of afternoon prayer (’ashr) vis-à-vis Banû
Quraizhah. The messenger of Allah dispatched
a group of companions to the province of Banû
Quraizhah and asked them not to observe the
1 Yusuf Alim, al-Maqâshid al-’Âmmah li al-Syarî’ah al-
Islâmiyyah, (Herndon: International Institute of Islamic Thought,
1415/1994, 2ndedn.,), p. 119.
afternoon prayer except when they have reached
their destination. But, the time for ’ashr prayer
was due while they were on the way. This made
the companions to be split into two divisions; the
first one adhered to the literal meaning of the
order given by the Prophet (SAW) and decided
not to pray until when they have reached their
destination, while the second division held the
contrary opinion. The latter group had reasoned
that since every prayer has its specific period,
the period for ’ashr prayer would have been
over should they decide to delay it till after they
reached their destination. They believed that the
Prophet (SAW) could not have wished that prayer
be delayed beyond its allotted time. As such, they
understood that the underlying reason behind
his order was to encourage them to hasten so
that they could reach the destination before
the allotted time of ’ashr prayer and observe it
there. Interestingly, when the story was narrated
to him, the Prophet (SAW) approved of both
positions as being correct each.2
From this episode it is clear that the second
group based their decision on the underlying
meaning of the prophetic order because of
their general knowledge that nothing is more
important than observing ritual prayers promptly.
This consideration of underlying meaning of the
prophetic order underscores the concept of ’illah
(ratio decidendi) which is intimately connected
with the theory of maqâshid as-syarî’ah.
Moreover, the second caliph, ’Umar was
especially notable when it comes to basing
verdicts on the underlying goal of syarî’ah. His
fatâwâ (i.e. legal verdicts) and policies were
deeply informed by consideration of the spirit
of maqâshid as-syarî’ah with the purpose of
advancing genuine human interest and welfare.
One significant feature of his administration as
the second caliph was his wide consultation
with the leading companions on any major issue.
This quality made it easy for him to introduce
2 This hadith was narrated by both Bukhârî and Muslim:
Mohammad al-Bukhârî, al-Shahîh, ed.Mustafa al-Bagha (Beirut:
DâribnKathîr, 1986), vol. 1, p. 321; Abû al-Hussain Muslim Ibn
al-Hajjâj, Shahîh Muslim, ed. Mohammad Fouad Abdul-Baqi
(Beirut: DârIhyâ al-Turâth al-’Arabî, n.d), vol. 3, p. 1391; Auda,
Maqasid as-syari’ah as Philosophy of Islamic Law, p. 9.
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people-oriented policies during his remarkable
administration. His decisions on conquered lands,
spoils of war, hadd (capital punishment), marriage
of non-Muslim, distribution of Zakâh to new
converts in order to endear Islam to their hearts,
etc. are major highlights of his regime.3
It may be observed that Umar’s decisions
on the above issues and many others were
premised on two significant principles namely
mashlahah i.e welfare of the community, and sadd
al-darî’ah i.e. blocking the means to what might
lead to unpalatable consequences. Following in
the footstep of the companions, the successors
(tâbi’ûn) were also mindful of the spirit of
the Syari’ah in giving legal verdicts. This was
possible for them because they directly trained
and graduated from the two famous schools
of law at that time, namely, the school of Hijâz
(Madînah) and that of ’Irâq. The former, otherwise
known as madrasah al-hadîth or madrasah al-
Madînah [school of Tradition or Madînah school],
had prominent companions like Zayd Ibn Thâbit
and ’Abdullah Ibn’Umar as authorities of Hadith,
while the latter which is also known as madrasah
Thus the companions and their successors
embodied the spirit of maqâshid as-syari’ah and
reflected same in their various legal verdicts.
Though, it should be made clear that during those
periods, terms related to the theory were yet
to be developed or defined in technical sense.
This nevertheless became possible only between
the third through the sixth centuries of hijrah
calendar. Notable scholars in these periods whose
writings were connected with the theory include
al-Tirmidhî al-Hâkim, Abû Zayd al-Balkhî (d. 322
/933), Abûbakar al-Qaffâl al-Shâshî (d. 350), Ibn
Bâbawayh al-Qummî (d. 381/991), Al-’Âmirî al-
Faylasûf (d. 381 /991), Abû al-Ma’âlî al-Juwaynî
(d. 478 /1085), and Abû Hâmid al-Ghazâlî (d.
505 / 1111).
Al-Raysuni6 has regarded al-Hakîm al-Tirmidhî
as one of the foremost scholars to employ the
term maqâshid in his three works entitled: ’Ilal al-
’Ubûdiyyah, Sharh al-Shalâh and al-Hajjwa Asrâruhu.
Inspired by his philosophical and mystical
orientations, al-Tirmidhî explained underlining
purposes of worship using experiential and
figurative approaches.7
ahl al-Ra’y [school of rationality], was headed
by ’Abdullah Ibn Mas’ûd, another influential
companion.4 Both schools produced a large
number of authoritative scholars whose fatâwâ
on different human endeavors were premised
on the spirit of maqâshid as-syari’ah. There are
many examples from each school to buttress
this claim5.
3 Muhammad Baltaji, Manhaj ’Umar ibn al-Khaththâb fî al-
Tashrî’, (Cairo: Dâr al-Salâm, 3rdedn., 1427/ 2006), pp. 114-115. The
Caliph ’Umar’s policy was generally based on the realization
of general interests of the community. A case in point is his
decision not to distribute conquered lands in Egypt and Iraq.
And he justified this by referring to Q.59:7. He was particularly
concerned about the incoming generation of the Ummah, who
would be deprived of landed properties and other material
benefits if the conqueredlands were eventually distributed
among the army. See also Yusuf al-QaradawiMadkhal li dirâsah
al-Sharî’ah al-Islâmiyyah, (Beirut: Al-Risalah Publishing House,
2ndedn, 1417 /1997), p. 59.
4 Muahmmad Zhâfir Kabbârah ’Abdul Fattâh, al-Tashrî’al-
Islâmî: ash’atuhu wa Târîkhuhu wa Mashâdiruhu, (Beirut:
Maktabah al-Rushd, 1stedn., 1424 /2003), pp. 117-120.
5 Firstly, in Islamic law of evidence, attainment of age
of puberty is a requirement for a testimony to be accepted.
However,  according  to  scholars  from  the Hijâzi School  of
law testimony made by an under-aged, while they are still at
the scene of incident, with respect to injury case would be
considered, in order to ensure the realization of maqâshid al-
Sharî’ah which is safeguard and protection of soul, one of the
five necessary universals of the sharî’ah. Secondly, scholars of
Irâqi school of law were unanimous on the fact that capital
punishment should not be carried out on a Muslim army while
the battlewas on. This was to avoid a prospect of decamping by
the person so punished and his sympathizers, a situation that
could disorganize the Muslim army. It has been related from
’Alqamah, a prominent Irâqi scholar, that during a battle at the
Roman land, in which another prominent scholar, Hudhayfah
also participated, a man drank wine, and when he was about
to be punished the latter stopped them from doing that for
fear of losing the battle. In this case, the overriding interest
(mashlahah) of the Muslim army was given a priority. Most
likely, carrying out of the punishment in this situation might
make them lose some physical and psychological strength to
continue the battle and the opponents would capitalize on
such lapses to defeat them. See al-Khalifah, al-Hasan Babiker,
Falsafah Maqâshid al-tashrî’ fî al-Fiqh al-Islâmî, (Cairo: Maktabat
Wahbah, 1421 AH/ 2000 AD), pp. 32-34.
6 Al-Raysuni, Imâm al-Shâthibî’s Theory of the Higher
Objectives, pp. 5-7.
7 For instance, he gave an analytical explanation of the
objectives of prayer thus “By the remembrance of God the
heart is refreshed and softened, whereas by remembering
one’s  passions  and  appetites  it  grows  hard  and  dry.  The
heart  may  be  likened  to  a  tree  which  derives  its  moisture
and suppleness from water: If it is too preoccupied with its
appetites to remember God, it will appear as if it has been
deprived of water. As a consequence, its roots dry up and its
branches wither. If it is not watered, it will be beset by the
3 |
MADANIA Vol. 19, No. 1, Juni 2015
Abûbakr al-Qaffâl al-Shâshî (d. 356) of the
Shâf’î school of law is another pioneer scholar
who devoted his book Mahâsin al-Syarî’ah to
explaining virtues and purposes of the syarî’ah.
This book is considered as the oldest manuscript
on the theory of maqâshid as-syari’ah.8 According
to al-Raysuni, the significance of the work has
been acknowledged by later scholars especially
Ibn al-Qayyim.9 Though, this work does not
provide epistemological and methodological
framework for Islamic jurisprudence viz-a-viz ushûl
al-fiqh. Its merit only lies in the explanation of
the wisdom and purposes underlying specific
rules of Islamic law in different areas, namely
ritual, matrimonial, penal, and financial.10
Another pioneer scholar who has made a
genuine contribution to the theory of maqâshid is
Abû al-Hasan al-’Âmirî (d.381). A philosopher, his
view on maqâshid was holistic and comprehensive.
He discussed wisdom and virtues of worships in
Islam in the sixth chapter of his book, namely,
al-i’lâm bi manâqib al-Islâm which could be better
classified as a reference book in the field of
comparative study of religions. The main objective
of highlighting such wisdom and virtues was
to show Islam’s unique position in relation to
other religions.11
One of the major contributions of al-’Âmirî
summer heat and its branches will become dry and brittle; if
you draw one of its branches toward you, it will fail to bend
and, instead, break off. Such a tree is good for nothing but to
be cut down and used to fuel fire. In the like manner, the heart
will grow dry and brittle if it lacks the remembrance of God:
It will be afflicted by the heat of the soul and pleasures of the
appetites, as a result of which one’s bodily members will be too
brittle to bend to God’s will and will cease obeying Him. If you
bend them they will break, and will be good for nothing but
to become tinder for the Great Fire. See Al-Hakîm al-Tirmidhî,
al-ShalâhwaMaqâshiduha, ed. Husni Nasr Zaydan, (Cairo: Dâr al-
Kitâb al-’Arabî bi Mishr, n.d.), pp.9-10 as quoted in al-Raysuni,
Imâm al-Shâthibî’s Theory of the Higher Objectives, pp. 5-6.
8 It is said to be available in Dâr al-Kutub publishing house
in Egypt. SeeAuda,Maqasid al-Shariah as Philosophy of law, p. 14.
9 Al-Raysuni, Imâm al-Shâthibî’s Theory of the Higher
Objectives, p. 8.
10 Mohamad El-Tahir El-Mesawi, “From al-Shâthibî’s Legal
Hermeneutics to Thematic Exegesis”, Intellectual Discourse.
vol.20, no. 2, (2012): p. 192.
11 Ahmad Al-Raysuni, “al-Bahth fî Maqâshid al-Sharî’ah:
to the theory of maqâshid is in his classification
of maqâshid into five categories, a taxonomy
that was later refined and developed by al-
Juwaynî and al-Ghazâlî.12 In addition, he was
also unprecedented in linking the prescribed
punishments to the five necessary objectives
considering them as mazjarah (i.e. protective
and deterrent measures). It is through these
measures that the syari’ah aims to protect
individuals against violations and abuse with
respect to their life for which retaliation (qishâsh)
has been sanctioned; their property in which case
amputation and crucifixion has been provided;
their privacy against which lashing and stoning
have been prescribed; their dignity against which
lashing with tafsîq (to regard someone immoral,
ungodly for committing illicit act) has been put
in place; and their faith in which case execution
is sanctioned.13
The above categorization by al-’Âmirî, it must
be noted, was devoid of protection of intellect.
In its place dignity was considered as one of
five indispensable things that the syari’ah seeks
to protect. As shall be seen later, protection
of intellect was added by al-Juwaynî who
outstandingly participated in the improvement
process of al-’Amirî’s five-fold classification of
maqâshid as-syari’ah. Also, the term mazjarah
which was used by al-’Âmirî to indicate the
protection of those five things was replaced with
the term ’ishmah by al-Juwaynî, before the latter
term was later supplanted by hifz by al-Ghazâlî.
Nonetheless, with the exception of al-’Âmirî,
the importance of the pioneer works of maqasid
as-syari’ah should be appreciated not as materials
that are concerned with epistemological and
methodological expositions of the theory. They do
not constitute indispensable works that must be
consulted for better understanding of the theory
of maqâshid as-syari’ah in terms of definition,
classification and methods of identification of the
theory. Rather, their contributions should be seen
as an antecedent necessary for eventual evolution
and development of the theory of maqâshid in
the hands of later scholars. So, the purpose of
Nash’atuh wa tathawwuruh wa mustaqbaluhu”, A paper
presented at the seminar on Maqâshid al-Sharî’ah, organized
by al-Furqan Islamic Heritage Foundation in London, between
1-5, March, 2005, p. 9.
12 Details on the taxonomy shall be discussed soon when
highlighting the contributions of both scholars.
13 Ahmad Al-Raysuni, “al-BahthfîMaqâshid..., pp. 9-10.
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highlighting these pioneer works is just to show
and appreciate the fact that Muslim scholars in
the past were ever conscious of inner meanings
and underlining purposes of different aspects of
worship and indeed the ultimate objective of the
syari’ah. To this extent, these pioneer scholars
especially, al-Shâshî and al-Âmirî could thus be
considered as the trailblazers of maqâshid as-
syari’ah.14
However, the theory of maqâshid as-syari’ah
as is presently known actually started manifesting
in the hands of Imâm al-Juwaynî. This famous
teacher of al-Ghazâlî occupied a lofty position
in the process of development of the theory.
To be sure, he can be rightly regarded as the
architect of the three categories of maqâshid
as-syari’ah, namely dharûriyyah, hâjiyyah and
tahsînîyyah.15 The wide adoption and acceptance
of this categorization by subsequent important
scholars i.e. his disciple, al-Ghazâlî, al-Râzî, al-
Âmidî, al-Qarâf î, al-Shâthibî, and IbnAshur in
the modern period, speaks volume about his
eminent position regarding the development of
the theory. His awareness and conviction that the
entire corpus of the syari’ah is purpose-oriented
informed his explanation of the rationale behind
the soil ablution i.e. tayammum. In addition to
this, his refutation of the school of al-Ka’bî for
the latter rejection of the legal category of Mubah
(permissible) is equally instructive, when he
remarked in his book: al-Burhân that:16
Whosoever is unaware that there are
objectives behind commands and prohibitions
(of the syari’ah) such person is not cognizant
of the syari’ah.17
Specifically, the invention of the three
categories of maqshâid as-syari’ah took place
while al-Juwaynî was differentiating between the
legal rulings that are premised on clear underlying
bases (’illah) and those that are not so based. This
14 El-Mesawi. “From al-Shâthibî’s Legal Hermeneutics to
Thematic Exegesis”, p. 192.
15 Mohammad HashimKamali, Principles of Islamic
juristic exercise eventually led him to arriving at
five-fold division which were later pruned to three
categories (dharûriyyah, hâjiyyah and tahsînîyyah).
These five divisions are: one, those legal bases
that have to do with ‘the essentials’, namely law
of retribution that has been sanctioned in order
to protect innocent soul against unjust execution;
two, those which concern human needs with
lesser importance than the first division, e.g.
transactions among individuals; three, those
which fall between ‘the essentials’ and ‘the
needs’, e.g. ritual purity; four, those which are
closely related to the third division, albeit with
less importance, e.g. recommended actions; five,
those whose objectives are not intelligible. This
last division according to al-Juwaynî is neither
practical nor thinkable. Because virtually all
Islamic legal rulings, including those pertaining
to acts of worship, are intelligible and captured
in the grand objective, which is realization of
benefit and repulsion of harm.18
It should be interesting to note how these
five categories were later reduced to three
famous categories. Having itemized the five
categories, Imâm al-Juwaynî did suggest that
the third and fourth divisions should be merged
together to form the third category, namely
tahsîniyah. Perhaps, this is due to the fact that
the definitions given as regards both divisions are
not so different. Not only this, the fifth division
could as well be subsumed under any of the
three divisions (i.e. dharûriyyah, hâjiyyah and
tahsînîyyah) because it was later sub-divided into
what can be rationalized and what cannot be, in
which case, it eventually belongs to one of the
three categories mentioned above.19
Another major contribution of al-Juwaynî to
the theory is his allusion to what are regarded as
the five major necessary universals in Islamic Law
which come under the category of dharûriyyah.
These include: religion, human life, the faculty of
reason, progeny, and property. In this connection
he stated thus:
Jurisprudence, (Kuala Lumpur: Ilmiah Publishers, 2000), p. 401.
16 Isma’il al-Hasani, Nazhriyyat   al-Maqâshid’   inda   al-
Imâm Muhammad al-Tahir ibn ‘Ashur, (Herndon: International
Institute of Islamic Thought, 1stedn., 1415/1995), p. 41; al-
Raysuni, “al-Bahth fî Maqâshid al-Sharî’ah” p. 13.
17 Al-Juwaynî, al-Burhân..., vol. 1, p. 295.
18 Al-Juwaynî, al-Burhân..., vol.2, pp. 923-947; al-Hasani,
Nazhriyyat al-Maqâshid’ inda al-Imâm Muhammad al-Thâhir bin
’Âshûr, pp. 42-43; al-Raysuni, Nazariyyat al-Maqâshid’ inda al-
Imâm al-Shâthibî, p. 14.
19 Al-Raysuni, “al-BahthfîMaqâshid al-Sharî’ah” ..., p. 13.
5 |
MADANIA Vol. 19, No. 1, Juni 2015
Islamic Law is comprised of that which is
commanded, that which is prohibited and that
which is permitted. That which is commanded
includes, for the most part, acts of worship.
As for those acts which are prohibited, the
Law has laid down deterrents for the most
serious of them. Generally speaking, human
life is preserved through the law of retribution,
chastity is preserved through the punishments
laid down [for related transgressions], and
people’s possessions are protected from thieves
by cutting off [their hands]20
As a matter of fact, al-Juwaynî’s contribution
to the development of the theory of maqâshid
as-syari’ah goes beyond the above inventions
of the three categories of maqâshid as-syari’ah
and the five necessary universals which come
under the first category, i.e. dharûriyyah. His
concrete contribution is personified by his
illustrious disciple, al-Ghazâlî, who continued
where his teacher stopped and developed his
earlier ideas. Yet, al-Ghazâlî is far from being
a mere imitator or a passive interpreter of
his teacher’s ideas on the theory. In fact, his
outstanding contribution to the theory has earned
him fame and distinction over and above that
of his teacher who admittedly had exerted a
huge influence on him.21 As observed by Nyazee,
al-Ghazâlî’s effort in this regard “was to knit, in
his organized and systematic manner, most of
al-Juwaynî’s ideas into a comprehensive theory.
He also changed and refined the terminology used
by al-Juwaynî. A theory that appeared ordinary
in al-Juwaynî’s work suddenly became alive in
al-Ghazâlî’s hand”.22
Accordingly, in his works, namely, shifâ’
and al-mustashfâ, al-Ghazâlî discussed very
extensively the concepts of mashlahah (public
interest) and ta’lîl (ratiocination) which are the
two indispensable conceptual foundations of the
theory of maqâshid as-syari’ah. His acceptance of
the concept of mashlahah as a source or proof,
is however conditional though. To him, for the
concept to be valid, it must be seen to actually
20 Al-Juwaynî, al-Burhân..., vol. 2, p. 1151; al-Raysuni, p. 16.
21 See Ibid. al-Raysuni, p. 12; al-Na’îm& Sharif,Maqâshid al-
Sharî’ah al-Islâmiyyah, p. 48.
22 Nyazee, Theories of Islamic Law …, p. 196.
promote human good.23
Furthermore, al-Ghazâlî was so convinced of
the primacy of the necessary universals earlier
propounded by his teacher that he boldly asserted
that the promotion of those five things [religion,
life, intellect, progeny and property] is sacrosanct
in all known belief systems and laws. This clear-
cut declaration has been widely regarded by
many writers as one of the new improvements
on the theory of maqâshid as-syari’ah that have
been made by al-Ghazâlî. Even though, it must
be pointed out, there was an earlier hint on this
claim by al-’Âmirî while trying to enumerate the
five-fold classification of maqâshid as-syari’ah:
As for preventive and deterrent measures,
their orbit in the six religions also should not
exceed these five things.24
After the periods of al-Juwaynî and al-Ghazâlî
and before that of al-Shâthibî there appears to
be no significant contribution to the theory of
maqâshid. It is believed that most of the scholars
who wrote on the theory afterwards contented
themselves with repeating, elaborating and
expatiating on what both scholars had said of the
theory.25 Yet, there are few scholars that prove
exceptional. For instance, al-Âmidî (d. 631) was
noted for his vehement defense of limitation of
dharûriyyah to those five things, namely religion,
life, intellect, progeny and property. As a matter
of fact, he argued that proper awareness and
understanding of realities of life would lead
to knowledge and even support the fact that
human welfare can only be realized through
the protection of religion, life, intellect, progeny
and property. In the words of Bernard Weiss,
al-Âmidî’s argument seemed to be that ‘when
we examine the world as constituted by God
empirically and inductively we discover at the end
of our investigation that these five necessities
and these alone are fundamental to everything
else’.26 Based on this line of reasoning, beside
23 Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence…, p. 401.
24 See al-Raysuni, “al-Bahthfîmaqâshid al-Sharî’ah”..., p. 20.
25 al-Raysuni, “al-Bahthfîmaqâshid al-Sharî’ah”..., p. 20.
26 Bernard Weiss, “The Intention of the Law (Maqâshid al-
Sharî’a) In Amidi’s Jurisprudence”, Conference Proceeding of the
international conference with the theme: “Maqâshid al-Sharî’ah
and Its Realization in Contemporary Societies”, organized by
Department. of Fiqh and Ushûl al-Fiqh in Collaboration with
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those five universal values, other human concerns
are ultimately lesser in importance.
Apart from his defense of limiting the
necessary universals of the syari’ah to five
things, al-Âmidî also has been credited with the
notion of prioritizing those universal values in
the event of possible conflict. According to him,
the first category i.e. dharûriyyât should take
precedence over the second i.e. hâjiyyât and the
third i.e. tahsîniyyât respectively, while the former
supersedes the latter. Perhaps for the first time,
al-Âmidî adduced reasons why the preservation of
progeny and human life should be given priority
over the preservation of intellect. He believed
that for intellect to exist and function properly,
it necessarily depends on the preservation of
progeny and human life. What more, al-Âmidî
strongly opposed the tendency to  give priority
to human life at the expense of religion.27
Among other scholars whose contributions to
the theory of maqâshid as-syari’ah are somewhat
significant is al-Qarâf î (d. 685 AH). He was said
to have purportedly added ’irdh i.e. dignity, as
the sixth necessary universal that the syari’ah
aims to protect and preserve.28 Though, this
addition provokes controversy among scholars.
Some scholars29 have accepted and supported
this addition of ’irdh mainly because like other
universal values, punitive punishment has been
stipulated for violation of dignity. But others30
have rejected it on the basis that there is no
correlation whatsoever between the prescription
of punishment and that which is a syari’ah
necessary universal. They further argued that
dignity is less important than religion, life,
intellect, progeny, and property. Unlike these five
necessary universals, violation of dignity cannot
International Institute of Muslim Unity, International Islamic
University Malaysia, 14-16, Rajab, 1427/ 8-10, August 2006, Vol. 3
(English &Malay Papers), p. 128.
27 Al-Hasani, Nazariyyat al-maqâshid’inda al-Imâm Muham-
mad al-Tahir IbnAshur, p. 50; al-Raysuni, Imam al-Shatibi’s Theory
of the Higher Objectives, pp. 22-23.
lead to a total annihilation and destruction of
human existence. Perchance dignity, it is argued,
could be put under hâjiyyât, the second category
after dharûriyyât, and not under the first category,
i.e. dharûriyyah.
With the exception of Ibn Taymiyyah (d.728
AH), the contribution of other scholars like his
disciple, Ibn al-Qayyim (d.751 AH) among others,
is no more than brilliant articulation of earlier
ideas as regards the centrality of maqâshid as-
syari’ah in Islamic legal thought. They sought to
provide sophisticated arguments and evidences in
support of the fact that, the syari’ahis purpose-
oriented and that the Lawgiver does not merely
command or forbid but for a wise reason. And
that the main objective behind every rule of the
syari’ah is to realize human benefit both in this
world and the next. But as earlier alluded to, Ibn
Taymiyyah caught the attention of scholars of
the theory with his firm opposition to the idea
of limiting the objectives of the syari’ah to a
particular number. His peculiar understanding of
the theory coupled with his rejection of the idea
of limiting the necessary universals to five made
him come up with a long list of new objectives
of the syari’ah. Most of these new objectives
have to do with inner dimensions of worship
as well as some ethico-social human aspects.31
Moreover, the eighth century of hijrah
calendar witnessed a landmark development in the
theory of maqâshid as-syari’ah. Popularly known
as al-Shâthibî, Abû Ishâq (d.790 AH) “stands as
the foremost scholar who has given this idea it’s
most comprehensive and elaborate theoretical
and methodological formulation”.32 With his very
important work which he titled, al-Muwâfaqât,
al-Shâthibî’s contribution to the development of
the theory of maqâshidas-syari’ah in particular
and the field of ushûl al-fiqh in general, is both
revolutionary and innovative. This is because he
spearheaded a radical departure from dominant
blind imitation and narrow discussion of the field
28 Al-Qarâfî, SharhTanqîh al-Fushûlfîikhtishâr al-Mahshûl,
(Cairo: Dâr al-Fikr, 1stedn., 1393 /1973), p. 391.
29 Like Qaradawi, see Al-Qaradawi, Dirâsah fî maqâshid
al-sharî’ah., p. 28; al-Qaradawi, Madkhal li Dirâsah al-Sharî’ah al-
Islâmiyyah, pp. 55-56.
30 Like IbnAshur, IbnAshur, Maqâshid al-Sharî’ah al-
Islâmiyyah…, p. 306.
31 IbnTaymiyyah, Majmu’Fatâwâ, vol. 32, p. 234; Badawi,
Maqâshid al-Sharî’ah’ inda Ibn Taymiyyah, p. 251; al-Raysuni, al-
Kulliyyât al-Asâsiyyah, pp. 85-86; al-Na’im& Sharif, Maqâshid al-
Sharî’ah al-Islâmiyyah, pp. 49-50.
32 El-Mesawi, “Maqâshid al-Sharî’ah  And  human  Socio-
Ethical Order”…, p. 32.
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of ushûl al-fiqh to a more creative and broader
discussion. In his views, adequate understanding
of maqâshid, alongside Arabic language, is an
indispensable requirement for proper and correct
ijtihâd. By implication, this is a fundamental
improvement on the status and role of the
theory of maqâshid as-syari’ah, in the process
of derivation of legal rules from the sources of
the syari’ah. Before al-Shâthibî, the theory of
maqâshidas-syari’ah was not given proper role
in the process of ijtihâd. Hence, his outstanding
contribution to the remarkable development of
the theory has come to be widely acknowledged
by scholars and students of Islamic legal theory.
It is therefore not an exaggeration to say that
al-Shâthibî is to the theory of maqâshid as-syari’ah
what al-Shâfi’î is to the science of ushûl al-fiqh.33
Nonetheless, al-Shâthibî’s developmental
efforts as regards the theory did not evolve from
a vacuum. His ideas were rather based on basic
propositions earlier advanced by past scholars
like al-Ghazâlî and his teacher, al-Juwaynî. To him,
and like those before him, the existential purpose
of the syari’ah is encapsulated in the protection
and promotion of the three legal categories,
namely dharûriyyât, hâjiyyât and tahsîniyyât.34
He also adopted the famous five necessary
universals, namely protection of religion, life,
intellect, progeny, and property. And just like al-
Ghazâlî, he openly declared that those universal
values are indispensable in all divinely revealed
religions and laws. In addition, his indebtedness
to those before him is noticeable in his copious
reference to the works of al-Ghazâlî to support
his arguments.35 With this in mind, we cannot but
wonder and ask: what then makes al-Shâthibî’s
contribution to the theory maqâshid as-syari’ah
unique and widely celebrated? Why then is he
often referred to as the reformer or at times as
the originator and champion of the theory of
maqâshid as-syari’ah, when it is well established
that he was indebted to earlier scholars?
33 Al-Hasani, Nazariyyat al-Maqâshid ’inda al-Imâm
Muhammad al-Tahir IbnAshur, pp. 65-66.
34 Wael B. Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories, (New
york: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 168.
35 See al-Raysuni, Imam al-Shatibi’s Theory of the Higher
Objectives, pp. 291-293.
In his introductory note to al-muwâfaqât,
Abdullah Draz, the famous editor of the book,
gave an insight into new things in the work
of al-Shâthibî. As earlier observed, al-Shâthibî
emphasized the fact that understanding of the
syari’ah should be premised on two things namely,
knowledge of Arabic language and acquaintance
with the aims and objectives of the syari’ah.
The entire literatures on ushûl al-fiqh, before
him, were exclusively devoted to the former,
while the latter part was apparently neglected,
despite its great importance. Hence al-Shâthibî
took it upon himself the task of filling this great
vacuum with his al-muwâfaqât.36
In addition, it should be added that, as a
monumental work in the field of ushûl al-fiqh,
Shâthibî’s muwâfaqât has enjoyed a considerable
appreciation of those concerned about the theory
of maqâshid; few names may be mentioned of
notable scholars like Andalusian scholar al-Haf îd
Ibn Marzûq (842 AD/1438 AH), Ahmad Bâbâ (1036
AD/1626 AH), Muhammad Makhluf (d. 1941 AD),
Shaykh’Abdullah Draz (d. 1958), and Abu Zuhrah
(d. 1974). The last of these eminent scholars
made the following statement about the book:
Abû Ishaq Ibrâhîm b. Mûsâ al-Shâthibî (d. 780
AH), a Mâlikî jurist, carried all the burden and
fulfilled this heavy task, or almost did it, in his
book al-muwâfaqât. He explained the objectives
of Islamic law clearly, and linked them with the
rules expounded by the theorists. He discussed
the sources of law in the light of these objectives
and ends. Thus, he broke the new grounds in
jurisprudence and that is the road that must be
followed from now on.37
Though despite its apparent importance, the
book was not spared from some form of neglect
for a considerable period of time. According to
Abdullah Draz, the book suffered such kind of
neglect probably due to two reasons. Firstly, as at
the time when al-Shâthibî wrote the book in the
eighth century, many books on the field of ushûl
al-fiqh had been in vogue with wide acceptance
among scholars. During this time, there was
36 Al-Shâthibî, al-Muwâfaqât, vol. 1 ...., pp. 5-6.
37 MuhammadAbu Zahra, Al-Shâfi’î, (Cairo: Dâr al-Fikr al-
’Arabî, 1978), p. 273; Masud, Shâthibî’s Philosophy of Islamic
Law, p. 109.
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a dominant mentality that the field had been
exhaustively studied, so much that any new work
could best be considered as subordinate to and
ultimately less important than the existing ones.
For this reason, Draz assumed that the book
was not deemed worthy of reading, because
nothing new was anticipated in the field of
ushûl al-fiqh. Secondly, the neglect might not be
unconnected with high level of Shâthibî’s style
of writing. His expression was so sophisticated
and advanced that the proper understanding of
the book requires mastery of several branches
of knowledge, namely the Prophetic Tradition,
science of exegesis, theology, as well as the
classical style of writing employed by foremost
scholars, and that of sûfî scholars.38
However, the book was to gain a wider
acceptance and appreciation in the modern
period. Modern reformers like Muhammad’Abduh
discovered its potentiality as a work loaded
with reform ideas. This was why he advised his
disciples to study and edit the book in order to
ensure its wider readership among scholars and
students of the syari’ah. ’Abdullah Draz was one
among those of his disciples who took up the
challenge of studying and editing the book.39
Consequent upon the above factor, many
works on maqâshid generally and al-Shâthibî
particularly have been produced. Ibn Ashur
whose contribution shall be considered shortly
is probably the most innovative and creative
of all modern writers who have written on the
theory maqâshid as-syari’ah. In the same vein,
for his detailed work on al-Shâthibî, al-Raysuni is
another outstanding modern writer on the theory.
In this work, al-Raysuni summarized al-Shâthibî’s
novel contributions to the theory as follows:
Firstly, unlike his predecessors, al-Shâthibî
treated the theory of maqâshid as-syari’ah
independently; this occupies the largest section
in his book; al-muwâfaqât. With this, the theory
became a visible, recognizable entity; no longer
could it be disregarded, undermined or belittled.
Secondly, for the first time in the study of
discussed human objectives as the second side
of the coin of the whole theory. This integrative
approach to the theory is considered crucial
to the understanding and realization of divine
objectives, mainly because it is through the
agency of human being that those objectives
are expected to be realized via his actions,
transactions and behaviors.
Thirdly, while all previous scholars did
unanimously agree on the genuineness of the
theory, there was little or no concern on their
part as to how those objectives can be unraveled.
It was al-Shâthibî who first explored this area
and came forth with methods of identifying the
objectives of the syari’ah.
Fourthly, in any field of study, comprehensive
rules and principles are required as a foundation
upon which such a field may be firmly based
and by which it can be regulated. So, particulars
and theories thereof become properly arranged.
This is why al-Shâthibî endeavored to lay down
some general principles with a view to regulating
various theories and particulars germane to the
theory of maqâshid as-syari’ah.40
Highlight on Shâthibî’s unique contributions
to maqâshid as-syari’ah will be incomplete without
talking about the inductive method (al-manhaj
al-istiqrâî) which he employed in a systematic
and unique manner as a methodological tool to
ground his new ideas on the theory of maqâshid
as-syari’ah. This inductive method presupposes
“an exhaustive thematic survey and analysis of
the syari’ah sources in order to establish universal
principles or simply syari’ah universals”.41 For “the
epistemic foundations of his theory turn out to be
anchored not in any multiply transmitted report
of Quranic verse, but rather in comprehensive
inductive surveys of all relevant evidence, be it
textual or otherwise. Because “When a large or
sufficient number of pieces of evidence converge
to confirm an idea, notion, or principle, the
knowledge of that idea or principle becomes
engendered in the mind with certainty because
the confluence of the evidence has the effect
maqâshid as-syari’ah, al-Shâthibî considered and
40 Al-Raysuni, Imam al-Shâthibî’s Theory of the Higher
Objectives …, pp. 311-323.
38 Al-Shâthibî, al-Muwâfaqât..., vol. 1, pp. 11-12.
39 Al-Shâthibî, al-Muwâfaqât..., vol. 1, pp. 11-12.
41 El-Mesawi, “From al-Shâthibî’s Legal Hermeneutics to
Thematic Exegesis”, p. 196.
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of a virtually complete, if not perfect, inductive
corroboration”.42
In principle, “the particular (juz’î) rules of the
syari’ah are governed by universal laws (qawânîn
kulliyyah). These laws could be known by a
comprehensive survey of the syari’ah discourse. By
resorting to the procedure of complete induction
(istiqrâ’kullî), one can move from the particular rules
to the universal laws of the syari’ah”.43 “To put it
differently, a group of verses in the Qur’ân may all
have, in common, one theme which happens to
be subsidiary to the main meaning in each verse.
The inductive corroboration of one verse by the
others lends the common theme more credence
and authority which could reach the degree of
certitude”.44
While it is true that scholars in the past had
used the inductive method, it is beyond doubt that
al-Shâthibî succeeded in using the method in a very
unique manner as he used it to derive the general
principles of the syari’ah as well as its objectives.45
In addition to this, al-Shâthibî integrated both
inductive and deductive reasoning making both
a unified methodology.46 Though, the concept
of thematic induction (al-istiqrâ’ al-ma’nawî) as
employed by al-Shâthibî is an extension of al-
tawâtur al-ma’nawî, a principle peculiar to the
science of the Hadîth. However, he did not restrict
the application of the principle to the Prophetic
reports; instead, he employed it to derive a set of
principles of universal validity from the authentic
sources of the syari’ah. To this extent,  he went
beyond his predecessors in developing a legal
theory of induction.47 Accordingly, it is on the basis
42 Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories, pp. 165-166.
43 Louay Safi, The Foundation of Knowledge: A Comparative
Study in Islamic and Western Methods of Inquiry, (Petaling
Jaya: International Islamic University Malaysia & International
Institute of Islamic Thought, 1996), p. 91.
44Wael. B. Hallaq,“The Primacy of the Qur’ân in Shâthibî’s
Legal Theory” in Islamic Studies Presented to Charles J. Adams,
edited byW.B. Hallaq and D.P. Little, (Leiden, 1991), p. 83.
of inductive corroboration that al-Shâthibî was
able to establish the validity of the five universals
(religion, life, intellect, progeny, and property).
For, these values “are advocated by the syari’ah
in no uncertain terms, terms that are individually
probable, but in their multitude, they corroborate
and affirm the validity of these principles beyond
any doubt”.48
While the inductive method was used in a
narrow way before al-Shâthibî, he seemed to have
used it in a comprehensive manner. For him, it so
appears, the inductive method whether perfect
(istiqrâ’tâmm) or imperfect (istiqrâ’nâqish), should
ultimately yield conclusiveness and certainty. This
line of argument runs contrary to the position of
many logicians and philosophers like Aristotle who
had upheld that the imperfect inductive method
should not enjoy certainty like the perfect one.49
Though al-Shâthibî had claimed that his legal
presuppositions, namely that the human benefits
(dharûriyyah, hâjiyyah, and tahsîniyyah), have
been established through the means of perfect
induction method. In the same vein, he claimed
that the five universal values are known to be
preserved in every nation. But this claim has
been discredited on a number of logical grounds.
First, al-Shâthibî himself had been quoted to have
implicitly affirmed that his presuppositions shall
be based on the imperfect induction. This is in
view of the fact that “the process of causation
does exist in a limitless number of rules in both
Qur’ân and Sunnah”.50 What this implies is that
it is impossible to survey all legal dispositions to
arrive at a clear-cut universal. Soualhi has argued
that al-Shâthibî’s induction in grounding the
aforementioned legal presuppositions is imperfect
mainly because his claim that the five values are
protected in every religion is contestable. He
contended that this generalization must have
been based on sound historical facts which al-
Shâthibî could not have claimed to possess.51
45 Al-Fasi,Maqâshid al-Sharî’ah al-IslâmiyyahwaMakârimuhâ,
p. 51; Yunus Soualhi, “al-Istiqrâ’ fî Manâhij al-Nazhar al-Islâm:
Numûzaj al-Muwâfaqât li al-Imâm al-Shâthibî” Islâmiyyah al-
Ma’rifah, vol. 1, no. 4, (1416/1996): p. 80.
46 Soulahi, al-Istiqrâ’fîManhij al-Nazar al-Islâmî..., pp. 91-92.
47Wael. B. Hallaq, “On Inductive Corroboration, Probability
and Certainty in Sunnî Legal Though”, in Islamic Law and
Jurisprudence, edited by N.L. Heer, (Seattle and London,1990),
p.30.
48Wael. B. Hallaq, “On Inductive Corroboration…, pp.25-26.
49 Al-Shâthibî, al-Muwâfaqât, vol.1, p.36; Soualhi, “al-
Istiqrâ’ fî Manâhij al-Nazhar al-Islâm”, p.60 and W.L., Resse:
Dictionary of Philosophy and Religion (New Jersey: Humanities
Press, 1983), p.25 cited in Soualhi, p.60.
50 Al-Shâthibî, al-Muwâfaqât ...., vol. 2, p. 7.
51 Yunus, Soualhi, “Al-Imam al-Shâthibî’s Induction: From
Mere Conjectures to Methodic Status”, (M.A. dissertation,
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Similarly, Djeghim observed that the limitation of
all mashâlih (benefits) to the three categories is
quite impossible based on the perfect inductive
method. However, this could only be possible
with the imperfect method.52 This shows that al-
Shâthibî’s conception of the method of induction
makes little or no difference between the perfect
and imperfect types. To him, both should lead
to certain and conclusive legal presuppositions.
Furthermore, to al-Shatibi, the whole
system of inductive method is actually based
on the relation between kulliyyah (universal) and
juz’iyyah (particular). A universal principle is made
of limitless number of particulars. Al-Shâthibî
asserted that both kulliyyah and juz’iyyah should
work together in a harmonious way. According to
him, “it is extremely impossible for the juz’iyyah
to be independent from their kulliyyah. For
instance, whoever takes a nashsh (text) in a
certain juz’i without taking into consideration its
kullî, he is definitely wrong. Similarly, whoever
considers the kullî without considering its juz’i,
he is wrong”.53 Though each particular that forms
a given universal is probable at individual level,
the universal principle thus formed assumes a
conclusive and certain status. It is irrelevant if
one particular contradicts the universal principle,
because this contradiction is not sufficient as to
form another contradictory universal. Thus the
contravening particulars shall be disregarded.54
Such  is the  remarkable contribution to the
theory of Maqasid by Imam al-Shatibi. Interestingly,
his ideas have inspired scholars in the modern
time, one of whom is Ibn Ashur (d.1973). As
earlier noted, for many centuries al-Shâthibî’s
novel contributions to the theory of maqasid
went almost totally unnoticed until modern
times. In other words, no major works were
produced that made any significant additions
to the ideas and methodology he formulated
regarding the conceptualization and study of the
theory. Only towards the middle of the twentieth
International Islamic University Malaysia, 1994), pp. 55-58;
Soualhi, “al-Istiqrâ’fîManâhij al-Nazar al-Islâmî”, p. 77.
52 Djeghim, Thuruq al-Kashf..., p. 268.
53 Soualhi, “Al-Imam al-Shâthibi’s Induction”..., p. 85.
54 Soualhi, “al-Istiqrâ’fîManhij al-Nazar al-Islâmî”, p. 79;
Soualhi, “al-Imâm al-Shâthibi’s Induction”, p. 86.
century did Ibn Ashur take up the matter in his
seminal work Maqâshid as-syari’ah al-Islâmiyyah.
IbnAshur’s approach and efforts in this regard
could be likened to those  of al-Shâthibî himself
in the sense that both avoided blind imitation
of their predecessors. This independent attitude
explains why their thoughts and ideas on the
theory appear distinct and original. “Realizing the
importance of the idea of maqâshid, al-Shâthibî
(d.1388) labored to reconstruct the whole of ushûl
al-fiqh around the maqâshid, thus making them the
unifying theme  of the issues and topics usually
dealt with almost independently of one another
by ushûl works. With him the maqâshid became
the axis of ushûl al-fiqh. IbnAshur,  on the other
hand, sought to reformulate the maqâshid not only
as a doctrine in Islamic jurisprudence and central
theme in ushûl al-fiqh, but as an independent
discipline”.55
Ibn Ashur made it clear abi initio that while
he benefited from the work of al-Shâthibî, he
was not out to simply repeat or abridge the
latter’s view. Rather, his concern was to highlight
the syari’ah’s intents regarding the laws and
rules governing civil transactions (mu’âmalât)
and refined manners (âdâb) to which Islam has
paid great attention in specifying and identifying
the various levels of benefit (mashlahah) and
harm (mafsadah) and the criteria for assessing
them. This feature according to him shows Islamic
law’s superiority over all positive laws and social
policies, with regard to the preservation of the
universe and reform of society.56 By implication,
Ibn Ashur’s major goal was to develop the
theory of maqâshid as-syari’ah into  a discipline
independent of ushûl al-fiqh.
It is however pertinent to note that Ibn
Ashur sought to explore the theory with a view
to making it an epistemic framework that would
55 Mohamed El-Tahir El-Mesawi, “Maqâshid al-Shârî’ah: An
Ushûlî Doctrine or Independent Discipline A Study of Ibn’Âshûr’s
Project”, Proceedings of the International Conference on
“Maqâshid al-Sharî’ah And Its Realization In Contemporary
Societies”, organized by Department. of Fiqh and Ushûl al-Fiqh
in Collaboration with International Institute of Muslim Unity,
International Islamic University Malaysia, 14-16, Rajab, 1427/ 8-10,
August 2006, vol. 3, (English&Malay Papers), p .68.
56 Ibn Ashur, Maqâshid al-Sharî’ah al-Islâmiyyah, pp.174-
175; Ibn Ashur, Treatise on Maqâshid al-Sharî’ah, p.xxiv.
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enable scholars to attain certainty and consensus
on matters of juristic difference.57 For him, this was
necessary in view of insufficiency of ushûl al-fiqh
and its lacking of definitive proofs. According to
Ibn Ashur, the mere presence of disputed issues
among different scholars as regards legal rules
is enough to disprove some classical scholars’
assertion that the field of ushûl al-fiqh entirely
embodies definitive proofs.58 Obviously, the main
reason for this conflict of opinions is a historical
one, namely the fact that jurisprudence was
developed three centuries before ushûl al-fiqh.
Ibn Ashur observed that except for al-Shâthibî,
no scholar ever took it upon himself to articulate
and expound the objectives of the syari’ah in a
focused and systematic manner. According to
him, even al-Shâthibî’s book is not immune from
unnecessary digression and mixture.59
Importantly, Ibn Ashur’s ideas on maqâshid
were profoundly predicated on the concept of
fithrah i.e. human nature or innate disposition
in every human being which, in its original form,
always inclines towards total submission to God,
the Creator. According to this concept, man is
by nature a believer in the Creator and to that
extent Islam and its law is in tandem with fithrah.
The Islamic law through its various injunctions is
therefore meant to restore human nature back to
its pristine and undiluted state of purity, thereby
riding man of corrupting elements which tend
to defile his pure nature. In Ibn Ashur’s view,
this concept of fithrah is intimately connected
with a primordial covenant between the Creator
and man, in which the latter attested to and
affirmed the supremacy of the former as Lord
worthy of worship and obedience. This implies a
trust which humankind among all creatures, had
accepted to bear responsibly.60 According to this
viewpoint, restoration of human pristine nature
is of higher objective of the shari’ah.
There is no gainsaying that, Ibn Ashur was
a pioneer among modern Muslim scholars in
the systematic study of maqâshid as-syari’ah as
57 IbnAshur,Maqâshid al-Sharî’ah al-Islâmiyyah …, p. 165.
58 IbnAshur,Maqâshid al-Sharî’ah al-Islâmiyyah…p. 169-170.
a distinct subject and not merely as a subsidiary
of ushûl al-fiqh. His contribution in this respect
has been widely appreciated and studied by a
large number of students and scholars. Apart
from the independence of the theory which he
audaciously proposed, the major highlights of
his contribution to the theory may be outlined
as follows:-
First, to the traditional division of the theory
into general and specific, Ibn Ashur added the
third type which primarily has to do with the most
specific branches of fiqh, namely mu’âmalât e.g.
marriage, financial transactions, and punishment.
Second, before IbnAshur, the theory of maqâshid
was restricted to the legalistic aspects of Islam.
But he sought to broaden its scope by regarding
the theory as a gateway to understanding the
human nature and by extension, understanding
the social order. Third, Ibn Ashur did tacitly
approve the classical enumeration of maqâshid
into five and utterly rejected the purported sixth
one i.e.’irdh (honor). Nevertheless, he added two
new maqâshid, namely freedom and equity, but
without specifying their specific category among
dharûrî, hâjî or tahsînî.
Those are some of Ibn Ahsur’s major
contributions to the theory of maqasid as-syari’ah.
However, his Moroccan contemporary, Allal al-
Fasi also deserves some note for his contribution
to the theory of maqâshid. In his work Maqâshid
as-syari’ah al-Islâmiyyah wa Makârimuhâ, he
emphasized the importance of the theory as a
manifestation of the syari’ah validity and viability
among other laws. According to him, he wrote
this book because of the stagnant study of
maqâshid at that particular time. His objective
therefore was to correct the way some scholars
used to explain every aspect of jurisprudence in
the name of maqâshid.61
In addition, there are two other relevant
books by two contemporary scholars. Their
authors were primarily concerned with the
explanation of wisdoms behind every ruling of
the syari’ah. The first one is entitled Hikmat al-
Tashrî’ wa Falsafatuhu (Wisdom and Philosophy of
59 IbnAshur,Maqâshid al-Sharî’ah al-Islâmiyyah …p. 172.
60 El-Mesawi, “Maqâshid al-Shârî’ah: An Ushûlî Doctrine or
Independent Discipline”. pp. 69-72.
61 Al-Fasi, Maqâshid al-Sharî’ah al-Islâmiyyah wa
makârimuhâ, p. 5.
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Legislation)62 by Ali Ahmad al-Jurjawi, a prominent
Azhar scholar. In the preface, the author claimed
that he wrote his book due to dearth of materials
concerned with the specific rulings of the
syari’ah based on their peculiar wisdoms. He
then itemized four issues which he considered
fundamental in all heavenly legislations; these
include (i) cognition of Allah and His Essence,
(ii) method of His worship, glorification, and
gratitude, (iii) command what is good and order
against what is bad, and cultivation of good
virtues, (iv) legislating in order to punish the
offender and make him aware of his limit in all
transactions.63
Written by Hamid bin Muhammad al-’Abbadi,
the second book is entitled: Min hikam as-syari’ah
wa Asrârihâ (The Syari’ah Wisdom  and Secrets).
Although no date of publication is provided, the
author in his preface to the second edition of
the book, mentioned that the first edition was
published in 1387/ 1968, and that when its copies
were exhausted, the second edition was published
in the year 1393 AH.64 By and large, both authors
sought to give detailed accounts of the wisdoms
behind each ruling of the syari’ah. Underlying
secrets behind every ruling of Shalâh, Shawm,
Zakah, and Hajj, and other rituals were explained by
both scholars. However, the first book i.e. Hikmat
al-Tashrî’ wa Falsafatuhu is more  elaborate than
the second one.  This is because aside covering
those aspects of worship mentioned earlier the
author also highlighted wisdoms behind rulings
of marriage, divorce, good manner among other
issues relating to human transactions, technically
known as mu’âmalât.
It must be noted, however, that aspects
covered by both scholars fall under al-maqâshid
al-juz’iyyyah. This aspect was discussed by Ibn
Ashur in the third part of his book while dealing
with purposes of the syari’ah in the realm of
mu’âmalât.65 However, the two books mentioned
earlier appear to be more detailed than Ibn
62 Ali Ahmad al-Jurjawi, Hikmat al-Tashrî’waFalsafatuhu,
ed. Khalid al-Attar, (Beirut: Dâr al-Fikr, 1418 / 1997).
63 Ali Ahmad al-Jurjawi, Hikmat al-Tashrî’waFalsafatuhu ...,
pp. 3-5.
Hamid Mohammad Al-‘Abbadi, Min Hikam al-Sharî’ah wa
Asrârihâ, (Beirut: al-Maktabah al-’ashriyyah, n.d).
65 IbnAshur,Maqâshid al-Sharî’ahal-Islâmiyyah ..., pp. 421-518.
Ashur’s in terms of examples provided and
explanations given.
Conclusion
The preceding paragraphs have discussed
the historical evolution of the theory of maqâshid
as-syari’ah right from the time of the companions
who lived its spirit, down to the period of later
scholars who systematized the theory to become
what it is today. The conception of the theory
was never an overnight incident; rather it is an
outcome of exhaustive intellectual discussions
and expositions of certain concepts which could
be regarded as foundations of the theory. From
a mere juristic principle subsumed under the
science of usul al-fiqh, the theory of maqasid
as-syari’ah has assumed an indispensable status
through the efforts of al-Shatibi and Ibn Ashur in
the eighth and twentieth centuries, respectively.
The theory of maqasid as-syari’ah engenders
fundamental principles of Islamic law which can
serve as authentic bases for proper application of
rules of the divine law. It should be observed that
the application of various principles of maqasid
as-syari’ah are largely applicable more in the
realm of mu’amalat that in the realm of ibadah.
References
Al-‘Abbadi, Hamid Mohammad, Min Hikam as-
syari’ahwaAsrârihâ, Beirut: al-Maktabah al-
’ashriyyah, n.d.
Abdul Fattâh, Muahmmad Zhâfir Kabbârah’, al-
Tashrî’ al-Islâmî: Nash ‘atuhu wa Târîkhuhu
wa Mashâdiruhu, Beirut: Maktabah al-Rushd,
1424 /2003
Alim, Yusuf, al-Maqâshid al-’Âmmah li as-syari’ah
al-Islâmiyyah, Herndon: International Institute
of Islamic Thought, 1415/1994.
Ashur, Ibn, Maqâshid as-syari’ah al-Islâmiyyah, n.d.
al-Hajjâj, Abû al-Hussain Muslim Ibn, Shahîh
Muslim, ed. Mohammad Fouad Abdul-Baqi,
Beirut: DârIhyâ al-Turâth al-’Arabî, n.d), vol. 3.
Baltaji, Muhammad, Manhaj ’Umar ibn al-Khaththâb
fî al-Tashrî’, Cairo: Dâr al-Salâm, 3rdedn., 1427/
2006.
Hallaq, Wael. B. , “On Inductive Corroboration,
Probability and Certainty in Sunnî Legal
Though”, in Islamic Law and Jurisprudence,
13 |
MADANIA Vol. 19, No. 1, Juni 2015
edited by N.L. Heer, Seattle and London,
1990.
Hallaq, Wael. B. “The Primacy of the Qur’ân in
Shâthibî’s Legal Theory” in Islamic Studies
Presented to Charles J. Adams, edited by W.B.
Hallaq and D.P. Little, Leiden, 1991
Hallaq, Wael B, A History of Islamic Legal Theories,
New york: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
al-Hasani, Isma’il, Nazhriyyat al-Maqâshid ’inda
al-Imâm Muhammad al-Tahir ibn ‘Ashur,
(Herndon: International Institute of Islamic
Thought, 1stedn., 1415/1995)
al-Jurjawi, Ali Ahmad, Hikmat al-Tashrî’ wa
Falsafatuhu, Beirut: Dâr al-Fikr, 1418/1997.
Kamali, Mohammad Hashim, Principles of
Islamic Jurisprudence, Kuala Lumpur: Ilmiah
Publishers, 2000.
El-Mesawi, Mohamad El-Tahir, “From al-Shâthibî’s
Legal Hermeneutics to Thematic Exegesis”,
Intellectual Discourse. vol.20, no. 2, 2012
Mohammad al-Bukhârî, al-Shahîh, ed. Mustafa
al-Bagha, Beirut: DâribnKathîr, 1986.
Al-Qarâfî, Shar, hTanqîh al-Fushûl fî Ikhtishâr al-
Mahshûl, Cairo: Dâr al-Fikr, 1stedn., 1393 /1973
Al-Raysuni, Ahmad, “al-Bahth f î Maqâshid as-
syari’ah: Nash’atuh wa tathawwuruh wa
mustaqbaluhu”, A paper presented at the
seminar on Maqâshid as-syari’ah, organized
by al-Furqan Islamic Heritage Foundation in
London, between 1-5, March, 2005.
Resse, W.L., Dictionary of Philosophy and Religion,
New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1983.
Safi, Louay, The Foundation of Knowledge: A
Comparative Study in Islamic and Western
Methods of Inquiry, Petaling Jaya: International
Islamic University Malaysia & International
Institute of Islamic Thought, 1996.
Al-Shâthibî, al-Muwâfaqât, vol.1, p.36; Soualhi, “al-
Istiqrâ’ f î Manâhij al-Nazhar al-Islâm”, p.60
and W.L., Resse: Dictionary of Philosophy and
Religion, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1983
al-Tirmidhî, Al-Hakîm, al-ShalâhwaMaqâshiduha,
ed. Husni Nasr Zaydan, Cairo: Dâr al-Kitâb
al-’Arabî bi Mishr, n.d.
Weiss, Bernard, “The Intention of the Law
(Maqâshid al-Sharî’a) In Amidi’s Jurisprudence”,
Conference Proceeding  of the international
conference with the theme: “Maqâshid al-
Sharî’ah and Its Realization in Contemporary
Societies”, organized by Department. of
Fiqh and Ushûl al-Fiqh in Collaboration with
International Institute of Muslim Unity,
International Islamic University Malaysia, 14-
16, Rajab, 1427/ 8-10, August 2006.
Yunus Soualhi, “al-Istiqrâ’ f î Manâhij al-Nazhar
al-Islâm: Numûzaj al-Muwâfaqât li al-Imâm
al-Shâthibî” Islâmiyyah al-Ma’rifah, vol. 1, no.
4, (1416/1996.
Yunus, Soualhi, “Al-Imam al-Shâthibî’s Induction:
From Mere Conjectures to Methodic Status”,
M.A. dissertation, International Islamic
University Malaysia: not published, 1994.
Yunus, Soualhi, Al-Imam al-Shâthibî’s Induction:
From Mere Conjectures to Methodic Status,
not published, M.A. dissertation, International
Islamic University Malaysia, 1994.
Zahra, Muhammad Abu, Al-Shâfi’î, Cairo: Dâr al-
Fikr al-’Arabî, 1978.

